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JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: This is the panel on 
Competition Policy in the Telecommunications Space. We have 
two commissioners, from the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Federal Communications Commission. We have a professor, 
Professor Yoo of Pennsylvania and Gene Kimmelman, President of 
Public Knowledge. They are lined up in the sequence that they 
agreed on to speak, and some may speak from their chairs and 
some may speak from here. The hope is that they will speak 
somewhere between five to ten minutes each, leaving us plenty of 
time for internecine warfare and questions from you. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Thank you, Judge, and 
thank you to the Federalist Society for having me. I’m delighted to 
be here to talk to you about net neutrality, one of my favorite 
topics, as well as how the FTC and the antitrust law and the 
consumer protection law should all fit together in this space. I’m 
currently a commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission but 
my prior experience as the head of the Internet Access Task Force 
at the FTC, which issued a report on broadband connectivity 
competition policy in 2007, actually has, in some ways, much more 
relevance to this topic. 
And as I think about these issues, about competition in the 
telecommunications space, a couple of antitrust related questions 
come to mind. What are the tools that antitrust can bring to bear 
for the kinds of concerns that people are raising in this area, about 
lack of competition, about foreclosure, about the ability of a 
gatekeeper to prevent other competitors in the marketplace or to 
reduce consumer choice? I think the FTC has two very useful tools 
that it can bring to bear on these kinds of issues. First of all, 
antitrust enforcement. The FTC and the Department of Justice 
have long brought enforcement actions against companies who are 
engaging in anticompetitive practices or conduct, including the 
telecommunications space. I will note the FTC has a common 
carrier exemption and I’ll return to that, so our authority has been 
limited to reach certain players in the market. 
What are some of the benefits that an antitrust approach can 
bring to addressing these kinds of competitive and consumer 
concerns in the telecommunications market? First of all, I think 
we can give businesses and consumers predictability, reliability, 
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and transparency in carrying out our enforcement mission. 
Antitrust issues have been long explored. They’re very heavily 
influenced by economics and overseen by the court system. There’s 
a lot of scholarly research in this area. 
I think there’s also a very good track record of a fairly quick 
resolution. I don’t think the AT&T breakup, necessarily, is a good 
example of that. That went on a very long time, but perhaps 
because there was a very regulatory approach to the breakup. But 
I do think antitrust can generally offer a quicker solution. 
One of the other benefits is expertise and procedural tools to 
develop an extensive factual record quickly and efficiently. We 
ask, is there a harm occurring in the market or likely to occur in 
the market? It’s a very fact-based and very fact-specific inquiry. I 
think one of the real challenges with prescriptive regulation that’s 
forward-looking is a knowledge problem. Hayek would talk about 
it in those terms. Does the enforcer or the regulator have the 
necessary information at hand about what’s really occurring in the 
marketplace? It’s very hard to predict the future. It’s very hard to 
foresee problems that may arise or good things that an overly 
restrictive approach might prevent. So a fact-specific, case-by-case 
enforcement method, I think, has great advantages. 
One of the other benefits of an antitrust approach is the 
emphasis on economics. That’s a very, very important part of 
antitrust analysis these days. The broadband market is a two-
sided market. What does that mean? What is the impact that that 
may have? Two-sided markets are very hot these days. Jean Tirole 
won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his observations on this 
topic. But what is so important about two-sided markets that 
requires proceeding with care? Whatever solution or restriction is 
adopted on one side of the market can have important effects on 
the other side of the market, and if you don’t understand how 
these two sides of the market are interrelated restrictions might, 
on balance, make consumers worse off. 
The second relevant tool the FTC has is our consumer 
protection authority. You may be aware that the FTC recently 
brought an enforcement action against AT&T. It’s in active 
litigation so I’ll just tell you what was said in the complaint. 
AT&T had promised unlimited access to some of its wireless 
Internet subscribers, yet it throttled the access for some of those 
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subscribers. The FTC brought a consumer protection action based 
on our deception authority, and also on our unfairness authority, 
but primarily our deception authority, saying that if a company 
has promised a certain level of broadband service and they don’t 
provide that level, that’s a fairly straightforward consumer 
protection violation that the FTC can challenge. 
So to bring this all back to some of the debate that’s going on 
today about net neutrality, there is one issue that I want to bring 
to the fore because it hasn’t gotten that much attention. The FTC 
has a common carrier exemption, so we can’t bring an enforcement 
action against a common carrier providing common carrier 
services. Right now, broadband is not classified as a common 
carrier service, so, for example, we were able to bring the action I 
just mentioned against AT&T. If broadband is reclassified as a 
Title II service, that is very likely to oust the FTC’s jurisdiction 
over these kinds of practices. 
I’m concerned about that. I’m concerned about it on the 
consumer protection side as well as on the antitrust side. For 
example, the previous open Internet order upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit includes a transparency requirement, so broadband 
providers right now have to give consumers information about 
how they manage traffic. That’s a promise that they make to 
consumers. If they don’t adhere to that promise, right now the 
FTC could bring an enforcement action against them, much like 
we brought one against AT&T in the throttling case. 
Thus one of the concerns that I have is losing the ability of 
the FTC to act as an enforcer on both the antitrust and the 
consumer protection side. If we pursue some other values through 
a regulatory approach, does losing the FTC’s authority to act in 
this area, on balance, make consumers better off? Given our active 
enforcement, and given the tools that we have to protect 
consumers on both the antitrust and the consumer protection 
front, I have my doubts. 
So I’ll stop there and look forward to the debate. 
[Applause.] 
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MICHAEL O’RIELLY: Well, thank you so much. I hope you 
will forgive me. I am going to stay tied to my written script. Given 
the sensitivities of everything happening right now, I think it’s 
best if I don’t go off the cuff with anything being said. So I hope 
you’ll forgive me on that point and I’m happy to answer any 
questions as we go along. 
I want to start by thanking the Federalist Society for having 
me and the opportunity to participate with such distinguished 
guests. Before I begin, I should mention that I intend to keep my 
comments rather general, so as not to address any particular item 
or situation presently before the Federal Communications 
Commission. Moreover, as a practice, I do not publicly comment 
on pending or potential mergers, so if people have questions on 
those issues, I’m bound to punt on them later on. 
Similar to our fellow agency, as ably represented by my good 
friend, Commissioner Ohlhausen, part of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s mission is focused on competition. 
In particular, the Commission focuses on competition within the 
telecommunications space, and, more broadly, the overall 
communication marketplace. Unlike the FTC, however, the FCC 
has a much different regulatory paradigm, resulting from a vastly 
different statutory construct. Practitioners of communication 
policy know that almost all authority provided by Congress to the 
FCC is contained in the Communications Act of 1934. From this 
statute, the Commission is structured to be a proactive oversight 
agency as opposed to adhering to an antitrust model. For good or 
bad, this means that the provisions in the statute provide the 
Commission with authority to respond to circumstances or 
conditions in the market, or to preempt circumstances that may 
happen. 
From a historical perspective, the concepts of competitive 
markets and competition within the communication space are a 
relatively new phenomenon in the life of communications policy. It 
is only within the last thirty years of the overall 130 year-or-so 
history that today’s vision of competition, rather than monopoly-
created policy, has garnered the focus and attention of legislators 
and regulators. This emphasis was solidified as one of the 
cornerstones of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
which enacted a number of deregulatory measures and operated 
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numerous market segments to competitive forces where only 
government-sanctioned monopolies previously existed. By 
rejecting artificial monopolies and embracing competition, the 
Telecommunications Act also provided the Commission with 
authority to prevent some private actors from engaging in certain 
practices that would harm competition. 
Separately, the Commission often uses its long-standing 
merger authority to consider and impose conditions on parties to 
transactions, regulate couching of these conditions under a pro-
competitive banner. These statutory provisions, including Section 
214(a) and 310(d), authorize the Commission to approve or reject 
the transfer of communications licenses between parties. In order 
to obtain Commission approval to complete a merger or a licensed 
sale, the parties traditionally have been required to show how a 
particular transfer would meet the so-called public interest, which 
has proven over time to be a moving, subjective target. 
To be clear, competition-related provisions in the statute do 
not necessarily always induce additional regulations but can lead 
to the deregulatory actions as well. For instance, Section 10 of the 
Communications Act, as added by the Telecommunications Act, 
and establishes a forbearance process to exclude any regulation 
from applying to a particular carrier or a telecommunications 
service or class thereof, under certain conditions. In fact, in 
considering whether to approve a forbearance petition, the 
Commission is required to consider whether doing so will promote 
competitive market conditions, including the extent to which such 
forbearance will enhance competition among providers of 
telecommunications services. 
There have been multiple debates and criticism over the 
application of this provision by the Commission since its 
enactment. Recently, the Commission determinations have 
effectively narrowed the existing forbearance authority and 
expanded the scrutiny of most applications, to the point of 
undermining its utility. Overall, the exercise of the Commission’s 
authority is subject to findings about the conditions in the 
marketplace. Since the advent of competition-centered policy, the 
Commission has tended to refrain from imposing new regulations 
or to withdraw existing regulations where a market or market 
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segment is competitive; that is, there has been an inverse 
relationship between competition and regulation. As competition 
within a communication market segment increases, the necessity 
of regulation decreases, and consumers, whether commercial or 
retail, are able to move to other providers for the same or similar 
product or service. This light-tough regulatory approach has been 
the relative norm for a number of years and helped produce a 
sound economic growth generated by the communications 
industry. Lately, however, the Commission seemed to be turning 
its back on this approach by imposing regulations even in 
competitive markets. In general, many of the communications 
market segments in the United States are experiencing fairly 
significant levels of competition. While critics always seek more, 
this must be balanced with the high capital and labor costs 
required in this sector to operate and compete effectively. 
The limitations of the Commission’s statutory oversight 
authority arguably rest at the front door of the Internet. Despite 
what some people suggest, the statute provides limited authority 
to the Commission to oversee or regulate the Internet backbone 
networks for applications and services. Accordingly, the 
Commission has declined in the past to subsume the Internet in 
the bowels of the Communications Act. Recently, I’ve started to 
see the prior decisions, the ones that have allowed the Internet to 
flourish absent government mandates and involvement, become 
the subject of the Commission’s rethinking process. 
I am a fervent believer of competitive forces, instead of 
imposing regulatory mandates or burdens. Whereas real, stable 
and lasting competition can tend to lead to lower prices for 
consumers, increased economic efficiencies, greater productivity, 
and advances in product and service offerings, regulations carry 
with them added costs, unintended and sometimes unforeseen 
consequences, lost productivity, and dead weight. Moreover, 
regulations interfere with the free market system, steering 
consumers and providers in directions that can be detrimental to 
innovation and the development of future marketplace. It is not an 
understatement to acknowledge that each regulation changes the 
path of communications history by some degree. 
I find the argument that you cannot have initial competition 
without the imposition of regulation to be completely fictitious. 
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Think of the multiple Internet e-mail and text offerings that 
compete today, without the imposition of any direct regulation. I 
also subscribe to the premise that government entities do not 
actually create markets or competition, except in the extremely 
problematic event, when a government enters the field as a 
participant. Even in the most positive light, governments can, at 
best, create an atmosphere or an environment for competition by 
private entities, who are willing to put capital at risk, put their 
financial future at risk, put their employees’ future at risk, and 
much more, to generate a product or service. Detrimentally, some 
governments, however, exert their power to bolster existing 
market players, often under the guise of preserving competition 
for market forces, such as bankruptcy, liquidation, or 
consolidation. 
With that framework outlined, I’m prepared to cede podium 
to the next presenter. 
[Applause.] 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’m delighted to be 
here, and I thank Judge Williams for doing such a great job and 
for Commissioners Ohlhausen and O’Rielly for setting up this 
discussion so well. I would like to take the conversation in a 
slightly different direction. I would like to present some data on 
competition. Policymaking is at its best when it is based on a solid 
factual foundation. In the absence of data, people are free to base 
their arguments on their personal preferences or their business 
interests so long as they are theoretically plausible. Absent data, 
advocates can base their positions on anything that might happen 
instead of focusing more narrowly on the more important context 
of what is actually happening. 
I will offer one fairly standard caveat: No data collection 
methodology is perfect. There is always some degree of 
incompleteness or inconsistency in the data. The solution is to 
acknowledge the limitations of the data and interpret it with those 
limitations in mind. The alternative would be not to rely on any 
data and to base policy on conjecture. One of the strengths of the 
data on which I am relying is that almost all of it was collected by 
2016] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 787 
the EU government or by the U.S. government, specifically the 
FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA). That means that the data was collected 
through a process that was subjected to extensive public scrutiny 
and comment and was analyzed by public servants doing their 
best to promote the public interest. Indeed, many of the objections 
to these data were actually raised during the collection process 
and rejected. So even if there are people who would disagree with 
the result, I don’t think we can attribute that to bad faith or 
special interests. These data were collected by government 
officials attempting to do their job as well as they could. 
The conventional wisdom is that broadband service is a fixed-
line duopoly. I have two qualms with that characterization. The 
first is that there is growing evidence that for many Americans, 
wireless is beginning to supplant fixed-line broadband service. 
Almost every projection has fixed-line service remaining flat both 
in terms of the number of subscribers and utilization, while 
wireless subscribership and utilization are projected to increase 
steadily. The technical community is working on a variety of ways 
to meet this demand, by retiring 2G spectrum during the 3G-to-4G 
transition, repurposing other spectrum bands that are not in 
heavy demand, and by deploying more cell towers operating at 
lower power. Others argue that there is not enough spectrum to 
permit wireless to completely replace fixed-line service. Rather 
than resolve this argument, I will present data that consider 
fixed-line service by itself as well as data that consider both fixed-
line and wireless service together. 
The first set of data that I am going to show you are collected 
by the FCC (Figure 1). The FCC has collected data semiannually 
on the number of providers offering service in every census tract 
in the U.S. The agency uses that data to calculate the percentage 
of U.S. households located in census tracts that enjoy broadband 
service, as well as the number of competitive options each of them 
enjoy. These data have the advantage of having been collected for 
the longest amount of time, so they are the best at showing trends. 
Although the FCC collects data on 3 Mbps, 6 Mbps, and 10 Mbps 
service, I will focus on the fastest tier, which is sufficient for most 
uses except for video. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Households Served by Three or 
More Broadband Providers, FCC Census Tract Data 
 
 
 Source: FCC 
What we see is that through 2011, the level of competition 
was relatively low, with only 3 percent of U.S. households being 
located in census tracts served by three or more providers. That 
situation begins to change dramatically in late 2011, reaching 93 
percent by the end of 2013, which is the last year for which the 
FCC has collected data. Even if one considers only fixed-line 
broadband, by the end of 2013, 65 percent of American households 
were located in census tracts served by three or more providers. So 
casual assertions that broadband represents a duopoly in the U.S. 
is not fully supported by the FCC’s data. 
This conclusion is subject to a number of caveats resulting 
from the limitations of the data. One well-recognized limitation is 
that under the FCC’s methodology, a census tract is considered 
served by a provider if a single household within it can receive 
service from that provider. The problem is that some census tracts 
are quite large, so large that the fact that one household can 
receive service often says little about whether other households 
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located in the same census tract can also receive service. The 
result is that the FCC’s methodology likely overstates the actual 
percentage of households receiving 10 Mbps service from three or 
more providers. While this criticism raises questions about the 
accuracy of the absolute coverage numbers reported by the FCC, it 
does not undercut the overall trend in broadband coverage, which 
is towards greater competition. 
In addition, the NTIA has also collected data about the 
percentage of U.S. households with three or more competitive 
options for fixed-line broadband (Figure 2). Unlike the FCC data, 
which collects data by census tract, a geographic area slightly 
smaller than a ZIP code, the NTIA collects data by the smallest 
standard unit collected by any U.S. government agency, known as 
the census block, which is the rough equivalent of a city block. 
Unlike the FCC, which disaggregates coverage by speed tier, the 
NTIA data simply reports coverage for a single basic tier of 
service. These data suggest again that the market became more 
competitive, with the number of households served by three or 
more broadband providers increasing from 40 percent as of the 
end of 2011 to 56 percent as of June 2014. What is striking, 
however, is that the NTIA data on competitive have been largely 
flat since June 2012, which means the positive trend identified in 
the FCC data over this period is not reflected in the NTIA data. 
These inconsistencies merit further investigation. At a minimum, 
however, these data raise a serious question whether significant 
portions of the U.S. can be properly characterized as broadband 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Households Served by Three or 
More Wireline Broadband Providers, NTIA Census 
Block Data  
 
 Source: NTIA 
I am also conducting research comparing U.S. and European 
broadband deployment. The project is motivated by articles I’ve 
seen in the New York Times and other outlets claiming that the 
U.S. is behind Europe and, therefore, that the U.S. should adopt 
policies that are more like Europe’s, focusing on service-based 
competition instead of facilities-based competition and subjecting 
the Internet to the regulatory regime that governs the telephone 
system. So Europe offers an interesting real-world comparison 
showing what happens when the Internet under the regulatory 
regime developed to govern the telephone system. If one compares 
200 kbps, that is, first-generation DSL speeds, both the U.S. and 
the EU have 99.5 percent coverage. 
When one examines 25 Mbps speeds, which is the only other 
tier for which both the U.S. and the EU have historically collected 
data, the story is quite different (Figure 3). The data indicate that 
Europe has been trailing the U.S. in terms of the number of 
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households that have service for the last three years by pretty 
significant margins. 
Figure 3: Percentage of Households with 25 Mbps Service, 
Total 
 
 Sources: EU; NTIA 
The disparity becomes even starker in rural areas (Figure 4). 
Whereas 25 Mbps service is available in 51 percent of U.S. rural 
households as of the end of 2013, only 18 percent of European 
rural households enjoyed that level of service. 
The disparity is equally striking in the newest broadband 
technologies: Fiber to the Home (FTTH) (Figure 5) and the fourth-
generation (4G) wireless broadband networks known as Long 
Term Evolution (LTE) (Figure 6). The press often portrays Europe 
as a leader in FTTH, but the data indicate that the U.S. is in fact 
ahead of Europe in this regard. 
792 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 85:3 
Figure 4: Percentage of Households with 25 Mbps 
Service, Rural 
 
 Sources: EU;NTIA 
Figure 5: Percentage of Households Served by Fiber to 
the Home  
 
 Sources: EU;NTIA 
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LTE has emerged as an important platform for broadband 
service, with commercial studies indicating that leading U.S. LTE 
providers deliver average download speeds of between 12.7 and 
19.1 Mbps, with peak service reaching 72 to 100 Mbps.1 LTE 
coverage in the U.S. has consistently exceeded that of Europe, 
with multiple providers now offering LTE service on a nearly 
nationwide basis.2 
Figure 6: Percentage of Households Served by LTE 
  
 Sources: EU; FCC 
What is equally interesting is the diversity of approaches 
that different European countries have followed. Four of the 
newest and poorest members of the EU—Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, and Romania—have the highest deployment levels of 
FTTH. The reason was the poor state of their traditional 
telephone networks, which placed these four countries among the 
six worst countries in the EU in terms of basic DSL coverage. 
Lacking a legacy infrastructure to leverage, these countries 
needed to install a new infrastructure and naturally opted to 
																																																																																																																																																			
 1 Sascha Segan, Fastest Mobile Networks 2015, PC MAG. (June 22, 2015), 
 2 Christopher. S. Yoo, Possible Paradigm Shifts in Broadband Policy, 9 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 367, 384–86 (2014). 
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install FTTH as the state-of-the-art high-capacity technology. All 
four of these new member states were able to achieve rural NGA 
coverage rates that exceeded the EU average, although their 
national NGA coverage fell short of the EU average. 
The more established European countries are also pursuing 
different strategies and achieving quite different results. 
Interestingly, two countries often identified as broadband leaders, 
France and Sweden, have emphasized FTTH to the exclusion of all 
other technologies. Interestingly, both countries consistently fall 
in the bottom half of EU countries in terms of 25 Mbps coverage, 
with France ranking 25th out of 28 EU states in 2012 and 2013 
and with Sweden ranking 20th and 16th during the same time 
period. Fiber-focused countries have faced particular challenges in 
serving rural areas. 
In contrast, Germany and the UK are largely foregoing FTTH 
(with only 4 percent and 1 percent coverage respectively) and are 
instead relying on VDSL to support 50 Mbps service to a larger 
percentage of their population. Interestingly, a report by Analysys 
Mason indicates that of the five largest EU states, Germany and 
the UK are the only ones projected to exceed the average coverage 
levels for Western Europe.3 The reality of limited resources 
presents policymakers with a stark choice captured nicely by a 
rhetorical question posed by an industry observer: “Is it better to 
provide 75–100 Mbps to 80–90 percent of the population or 1 Gbps 
to 10–20 percent of the population? Especially when that 10–20 
percent is already enjoying faster speeds than the rest.”4 
What explains the persistent advantage enjoyed by the U.S.? 
The most likely explanation is the different policy approaches 
taken on either side of the Atlantic. U.S. policy focuses on 
promoting facilities-based competition, while European policy 
																																																																																																																																																			
 3 ANALYSYS MASON, REPORT FOR BT: INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARK OF SUPERFAST 
BROADBAND 8 fig. 3 (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.analysysmason.com/PageFiles 
/44401/Analysys_Mason_Superfast_broadband_benchmark_Nov2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7YU7-JQHN]. 
 4 Teresa Mastrangelo, Is VDSL2 Vectoring Destroying the FTTH Business Case?, 
BROADBAND TRENDS (July 29, 2013), https://broadbandtrends.wordpress.com 
/2013/07/29/is-vdsl2-vectoring-destroying-the-ftth-business-case/ [https://perma.cc 
/256T-W64C]. 
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generally emphasizes infrastructure sharing. Regression analysis 
that takes advantage of the considerable policy heterogeneity 
across Europe reveals that this difference in approach is strongly 
correlated with broadband coverage. Indicators of infrastructure 
sharing and service-based competition are statistically 
significantly negatively correlated with 25 Mbps coverage. 
Indicators of facilities-based competition are statistically 
significantly positively correlated with 25 Mbps coverage.5 
This conclusion is corroborated by direct measurements of 
investment per household. Consistently, since 2007, U.S. 
companies invested 2 to 2.5 times more per household in 
broadband than did their European counterparts.6 Surprisingly, 
EU telecommunications providers have seen their revenues 
decline throughout this period despite increased utilization. 
Moreover, the average U.S. household uses 50 to 60 percent more 
bandwidth than the average European household.7 This 
underscores the danger of relying exclusively on download speeds 
as a measure of broadband quality. The engineering community 
has long recognized that the better measure is the bandwidth-
delay product, which is the download speed times utilization, 
which reveals that U.S. users are getting significantly more value 
from the Internet, which explains in part why they pay higher 
prices for the highest-bandwidth services. 
The last thing I would say is there remains a lingering 
problem with adoption. Although 25 Mbps service is available in 
85 percent of U.S. households, only 32 percent subscribe. Europe 
exhibits the same pattern with 25 Mbps service being available in 
62 percent of households and with only 15 percent of them 
subscribing.8 This underscores the need for regulators to look at 
more than just supply side considerations, such as pricing and 
network build-out that have traditionally been the focus of 
regulation. Data collected by the Pew Internet Study, UK 
																																																																																																																																																			
    5  Christopher S. Yoo, U.S. vs. European Broadband Deployment: What Do the Data 
Say? 9–12 (University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 14-35 June 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2510854 
[https://perma.cc/MPJ2-HC4R]. 
    6  Id. at 13 fig.5. 
  7   Id. at 19. 
    8  Id. at 14–15. 
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regulator Ofcom, and the European Commission indicate that 
pricing and availability are not the primary obstacles to adoption.9 
This finding is corroborated by a study conducted by two FCC 
staffers and two people from a Kentucky-based organization called 
Connected Nation that focuses on wiring rural communities. They 
surveyed families from the roughly thirty percent of U.S. 
households that do not subscribe to broadband in order to find out 
why. This study revealed that two-thirds would not subscribe to 
broadband even if it were free.10 Although many have attempted 
to dismiss this fact as mere ignorance, those interested in 
promoting broadband adoption must recognize the need to 
complement supply-side strategies focusing on pricing and with 
demand-side strategies that increase and demonstrate the value of 
broadband. 
These surveys underscore the need to value proposition. 
Providers in other countries are pursuing novel approaches known 
as zero-rating strategies, such as Facebook Zero and Twitter Zero, 
that provide clear benefits to those who have not yet adopted 
broadband. 
[Applause.] 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Christopher talks twice 
as fast as other people, so he should have been cut by 50 percent. 
Gene. 
GENE KIMMELMAN: Thank you, Judge. Thank you to the 
Federalist Society for inviting me and to my colleagues for 
engaging this afternoon. I’m going to present a slightly different 
perspective that actually, I think, brings some of this together, 
																																																																																																																																																			
 9 See European Commission Directorate-General for Communications Networks, 
Content and Technology, Communications Committee, Working Document, Broadband 
Lines in the EU: Situation at 1 July 2012, at 13 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/ 
information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1700 [https://perma.cc/ 
7GZU-2A4M]; OFCOM, COMMUNICATIONS MARKET REPORT 2013, at 368 (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/2013_UK_CMR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LW7R-XZ98]; Kathryn Zickuhr, Who’s Not Online and Why, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/RTZ7-B9D4]. 
 10 Octavian Carare et al., The Willingness to Pay for Broadband of Non-Adopters in 
the U.S.: Estimates from a Multi-State Survey, 30 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 19 (2015). 
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and I recognize that Commissioner O’Rielly couldn’t speak to the 
specific issues in front of the FCC and I’m going to try not to, as 
well, so that we don’t have to ex parte this. 
[Laughter.] 
GENE KIMMELMAN: I think that there’s a lot of merit to 
antitrust enforcement. I worked in the Justice Department in 
antitrust and I think there’s just tremendous benefit to it, but not 
to the exclusion of a lot of work that the Federal Communications 
Commissions does in and around broadband policy, and then, 
more specifically, net neutrality. My theme is that the critical 
issue here is how to harmonize split jurisdiction appropriately as 
Congress has directed to three agencies—DOJ, FTC, and the 
FCC—to engage appropriately, whether it’s in a transactional 
context or in the behavior of individual or multiple companies in 
the marketplace. 
The important issue is whether there can be consistency 
between antitrust enforcement and FCC regulatory activity. I 
believe there are ways to do it well and there are ways to do it not 
so well. Each approach, as you’ve heard today, is thoroughly 
engaged in competition analysis, under different statutory 
guidance, but I see no reason why they cannot be generally 
consistent and harmonious. For example, I think that in some 
cases Commissioner Ohlhausen is right—you can have quick 
antitrust enforcement. In some cases, it’s not so fast. It’s not just 
the recent enforcement action against AT&T, but the FTC’s 
Google investigation was quite lengthy and in Europe it’s still 
going on. So there are issues in innovative markets where 
technology is changing quickly, where you can look at pros and 
cons of antitrust enforcement and pros and cons of a case-by-case 
analysis. The benefit may be that you’re very fact specific. The 
difficulty may be that if you are an innovator with a new service in 
a garage, and you are having trouble getting access to the 
Internet, or speeds, or quality, the time it takes to do the case-by-
case analysis may not be beneficial to your ever reaching the 
market or sustaining your business—which is not to say that 
regulation is fast. 
But one of the benefits of an appropriate structural 
regulatory model might be to send very clear signals and very 
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strong signals to the marketplace of what is acceptable behavior, 
what is prohibited behavior, and how things in the middle could 
be balanced. The important thing is that the signals to the 
marketplace actually work effectively to indicate what behavior to 
watch out for and what is almost invariably green-lighted. I’m not 
sure the fact that something is a two-sided market changes the 
matter that much if the regulatory process is being done 
appropriately and thoughtfully, because surely it should consider 
all the ramifications, not just to the user side but to the supply 
side, in any regulatory paradigm. 
I fully understand the need to worry about jurisdiction, and I 
think that what we ought to be most concerned about, societally, 
is that we’re not duplicating regulation and we’re not promoting 
inconsistent rules and enforcement practices, but I’m not so sure it 
matters whether it’s done at one agency or another if they’re 
practicing sound policy and being very straightforward, and 
subject to judicial review, as each of these agencies is. 
I appreciate Commissioner O’Rielly highlighting the FCC 
focus on competition. One thing has jumped out to me over the 
years, in looking at the transactional side of this. Whether it’s 
DOJ or the FTC, looking at mergers and acquisition, or the FCC, 
is that in areas where there may be limited competition going in, 
there are some interesting statutory limitations that can apply. If 
you’re not dealing with a straight monopolization case in 
antitrust, you might be looking at a market that is highly 
concentrated, even possibly monopolistic, and the discussion with 
the antitrust enforcement agency of overcharging consumers, 
harming innovation, might be, is this transaction making it 
worse? 
That is the most likely conversation. And if it’s already 
substantially bad and the market isn’t working competitively, 
many times my colleagues in antitrust would say, “You have a 
problem but it’s not our problem. Go over there.” For this industry, 
“over there” is the FCC. Within the FCC’s statutory mandate, 
however vague the public interest may be, Congress has 
specifically directed the FCC to look to actually promote 
competition, and that is something that can be difficult in some 
instances, in pure antitrust enforcement. 
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From my perspective, the ideal would be harmonizing the 
tasks of the two functions within our government and making 
sure that what is being done in antitrust enforcement is consistent 
with what is being done in regulatory policy or reviewing 
transactions and license transfers at the FCC. The FCC might 
realistically be able to do something that can actually open a 
market to more competition. I agree with Commissioner O’Rielly 
that the goal should really be to seek competitive forces and not 
use regulation as a tool or a surrogate for competition, where it 
certainly doesn’t always promote competition. 
However, then we get into the factual analysis. What does 
the market look like? I think Professor Yoo’s data are 
interesting—I’d like to review them. It does remind me a little bit 
of the history in the early twentieth century, when we had a lot of 
companies trying to come in and compete in what we call 
telephone service. It didn’t really work economically. So I don’t 
know if we’re hitting a plateau or if we’re on some great 
ascendancy for broadband. I also would love to see your 10-
megabits numbers put into the 25-megabits range, just to see 
what happens. 
We just released a survey today at Public Knowledge, John 
Horrigan did, looking at the different side of this, the consumer 
attitudes. It is on our website and available, but the short 
headline is that when we asked people, “Would you use wireless as 
a substitute for wired-line broadband?” more than 90 percent said 
no, and on the questions related to how easy or difficult it is to 
switch broadband service, consumers were profoundly concerned 
that it was not at all easy. There was an enormous amount of 
stickiness, whether there is one other provider or two. There were 
some important issues there on substitutability and how markets 
really work, that I would love you to look at, in conjunction with 
your data. 
What we see right now, from my perspective, is that as much 
as we would love competition and more players, there are 
problems in broadband that do need public oversight. We ought to 
be looking at how to use antitrust appropriately in conjunction 
with communications policy oversight, and just make sure they 
are consistent and truly harmonized. Thank you. 
[Applause.] 
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JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Perhaps speakers 
would like to take issue with each other. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’m happy to start 
off, just because Gene directed his last comment towards me. I 
always appreciate talking with you, Gene, just because I think you 
are very thoughtful. I find that a lot of times people talk past each 
other in this space, and I think you have always been engaged and 
constructive. 
It is true that we saw a spate of voice competition once, 
following the 1996 Act, that fell off. That was all based on the 
infrastructure sharing model that Europe largely follows today, 
and it wasn’t robust. It was all reselling someone else’s pipe. And 
there are a lot of us who have been skeptical about that. Herb 
Hovenkamp is a great author. It’s like saying are we going to have 
competition for bananas within a grocery store? Are we going to 
have all these banana carts running around the store? They all get 
the same bananas from the same wholesale place in the back, the 
same product, and all they’re doing is squeezing margin. 
Frankly, if you have a monopoly pipe and, really, that’s all 
you’re going to get, that’s not an unreasonable policy to adopt. 
We’re in a different space now, where we’re having to make 
investments. For voice, in particular, wireless—you’ve seen what’s 
happened with fixed-line subscriptions. They’re dropping like a 
stone and none of my students have them anymore. So one of the 
things that we’ve understood in certainly the voice space, the 
facilities-based competition ended up being a wonderful solution 
that became much more robust. 
I understand Gene’s skepticism about the future of wireless. I 
do see a lot of numbers pointing that way. Interestingly, a survey 
that was published and presented at TPRC said 11 percent of U.S. 
households are now wireless-only for broadband. Some countries 
in Europe are in excess of 20 percent. And if you look at the 
numbers—well, I guess what I would say is it’s plausible to me 
that this would happen, and I find so many people doing what I 
think of as technologically determined views—oh, this can’t 
happen, or this must happen. 
And anyone who has followed this business long enough 
knows that that’s a good way to go broke, because a lot of things 
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that we thought were so sure—I mean, we talked about the 
impeding fiber monopoly for a while, and then we talked about the 
impending cable monopoly, and right now AT&T has upgraded to 
VDSL and they’re taking subscribers away from cable. And, 
actually, I think that’s what’s wonderful about this is we don’t 
really know. I do see, actually, a lot of my students don’t have 
fixed-line connections anymore and are relying exclusively on 
wireless broadband. I always keep an eye on them because they’re 
a trend of where things are going. 
But my point is, one of the brilliant things of the U.S. policy 
is we’re flexible. When I started in this business fifteen years ago, 
AT&T was focusing on U-verse when Verizon was focusing on 
FiOS. One of my students asked, “Isn’t AT&T being incredibly 
shortsighted?” I replied, “Well, the great thing is we get to find 
out.” We have an environment in which we have that kind of 
experimentation, I think looking back what they would say is 
Verizon doesn’t talk about FiOS anymore, and it costs 2-1/2 to 3 
times more, or 3-1/2 times more. So it’s a wonderful experiment 
that Europe is repeating. 
Don’t get me wrong—I’m not trying to bash AT&T. Verizon 
did the same bit on LTE when AT&T wasn’t ready to move and 
got tremendous benefit out of that, but this is equity risk, people 
putting their money on the table with major investments, and if it 
pays off, that’s how we drive it forward, and I want people trying 
to out-invest each other instead of trying to out-regulate each 
other, by trying to get some regime where they’re trying to use the 
system to get a legal advantage as opposed to something in the 
marketplace. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I probably neglected to say 
this at the beginning but I should say it now, which is that I do 
only speak for myself and not the Federal Trade Commission. 
[Laughter.] 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: I do think the discussion 
raises a couple of interesting issues. Gene, I think you’re right 
that having a regulation in place is quicker and more certain than 
a case-by-case enforcement approach, but I think you have to look 
at Type 1 and Type 2 errors—what are the bad things you’re 
preventing but also what are some of the good things that you 
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may be preventing. My concern is that adopting a regulatory 
model that freezes into place what the Internet looks like right 
now, we don’t know what we’re missing out on. And I agree—
competition, I think, is the first line of defense for consumers in 
telecommunications policy as well as everywhere else in the 
economy, and I think we need to take a hard look at regulatory 
proposals and ask will they lead to more competition in networks, 
or will they limit how these networks can evolve? We’ve certainly 
seen a lot of competition, a lot of innovation at the edge, and I 
think that’s a good thing, but I think we need to think hard about 
innovation and competition in the networks as well. 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: I’d be interested—if I understood, 
Gene, and without talking about anything specific or inquisitive 
item— 
[Laughter.] 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: —if I understand your points, and I 
took them very well, that consistency and harmonization between 
the agencies that we represent is a good thing, and I wondered if 
you couldn’t comment about the point that the Commissioner 
made regarding the lack of authority, that if certain decisions are 
made that the FTC would have no authority in some items, and 
how does that fit with the consistency and harmonization if the 
FTC has no authority in its space? 
GENE KIMMELMAN: I would worry if nobody has 
authority over something that’s as important as either something 
directed by Congress or agencies to oversee, or something that we 
just think is important for society, and agencies would at least be 
cognizant of. So, in this regard, if broadband were a Title II 
service— 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: Well, I didn’t really say that. 
[Laughter.] 
GENE KIMMELMAN: The FCC has Customer Proprietary 
and Network Information authority to protect privacy. It has 
authority under Title 6 over cable privacy issues, as well, so there 
are a variety of things the FCC has. It would be interesting to look 
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and see what the actual dividing line would be. Again, the same 
principle applies in antitrust, following the line of the Trinko case, 
as an example. We’re very careful to make sure that antitrust isn’t 
interfering with the regulatory regime. Using the same logic here, 
again, to be consistent and harmonized, it’s important to make 
sure that we have protections for consumers from one of the 
agencies or the other and that certainly we don’t have both of 
them going in the opposite directions. That’s my main point here. 
But I’m pleased to see the FTC move on the AT&T question 
of fairness in the presentation of its services. There are things the 
FCC could do if the FTC weren’t doing them, and the important 
thing is that there’s always an agency that can address an issue. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I support what the 
FTC is doing. I do not think that anyone would dispute that people 
should get what they have been promised. I also agree entirely 
with Gene that reducing switching costs makes markets work 
better. For example, number portability in the wireless space was 
a tremendous success. There are other measures we could take 
that would help reduce switching costs still further. What’s 
fascinating in Europe, the inside wiring is almost always owned 
by the incumbent provider. Some regulatory agencies are 
experimenting with new ways to provide access to conduits and 
other network elements that are currently not subject to 
competition and are likely to be competitive in the foreseeable 
future. 
So I think that there is a room for new thinking, but I love 
the idea of framing it in terms of reducing switching costs and 
increasing competition in networks, as Commissioner Ohlhausen 
said, which in turn directs the focus on those areas where we do 
not have enough competition. Many metropolitan areas do have a 
workable level of competition. 
Another aspect of the debate that bothers me is that it is 
primarily focused on preserving competition in content and 
applications at the edge, which is the part of the industry that is 
already very competitive and unprotected by entry barriers and 
thus very likely to stay that way. Those advocating edge 
innovation often wrap themselves in the rhetoric of protecting the 
garage innovator. But a closer look reveals that the debate is 
usually between large companies who are in a position to take 
804 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 85:3 
care of themselves in any arm’s-length negotiation. Instead, the 
debate should be reframed in terms of the real policy problem, 
which is how to enhance competition and encourage investment in 
last-mile networks. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Questions from the 
floor? It’s very hard for me to see, because the lights are coming 
right at my eyes. But if you put your hand up and wave it, I 
should be able to pick you out. 
GENE KIMMELMAN: While you’re pondering, I want to 
come back to Chris on the data issue. What I was referring to was 
not really the 1996 Telecommunications Act but really the early 
twentieth century, before the modern AT&T monopoly emerged. 
We had a lot of phone companies. It didn’t really work. So there 
are some fundamental economics here. I think you mentioned 
economies and capital investment. There are obviously some big 
issues here. How many competitors are we really going to get? 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Actually, like any 
good academic I have a standard answer—I have an article on 
this. 
[Laughter.] 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: It came out in the 
Texas Law Review.11 The conventional wisdom is that the U.S. has 
always had a privately owned telephone system, in contrast with 
the rest of the world where telephone service was traditionally 
operated by governments. The conventional wisdom overlooks the 
fact that the U.S. Postal Service took over the U.S. telephone 
system for one year during World War I, a fact that has been 
largely lost in history. And the big question is not why the 
government took over the telephone system. The exigencies of 
World War I had already led the federal government to take over 
the radio system and the railroads, and Postmasters General had 
been clamoring for such a takeover for fifty years. The question is 
why the Federal Government gave it back. 
																																																																																																																																																			
 11 Michael A. Janson & Christopher S. Yoo, The Wires Go to War: The U.S. 
Experiment with Government Ownership of the Telephone System During World War I, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 983 (2013). 
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The government takeover of the telephone system followed 
the early competitive era of the telephone industry. AT&T was 
trying to replicate the business model used for the telegraph 
system, which focused on connecting major business centers with 
long-distance connections. The leaders of AT&T could not see why 
anyone would want a telephone in their home and declined to 
connect small towns, rural areas, and even suburban 
neighborhoods of large cities. This left a green-field opportunity 
for independent telephone companies to come in. AT&T also 
concluded that farmers do not need telephones. As it turns out, 
the fact that farmers were among the most isolated members of 
society meant that they were among the people who wanted 
phones the most. Farmers established service by connecting 
telephone wires up to their barbed-wire fences and using that to 
provide service to their houses. AT&T saw little potential in such 
attempts because the low quality of those connections would not 
support long-distance service. But 99 percent of connections were 
local calls within twenty miles of your home. People simply did not 
call long distance back then. 
So what is fascinating is that the first quarter of the 
twentieth century saw a robust competitive environment emerge 
in the telephone industry. In 1907, AT&T undertook a clear 
change in policy. Rather than try to compete with the 
independents, AT&T attempted to merge to monopoly by 
acquiring the independent telephone systems with which it was 
competing. If the independent telephone system refused, AT&T 
instead employed a classic division of markets, in which AT&T 
agreed to withdraw from the independent telephone system’s 
service area in return for a promise from the independent not to 
expand outside that area. These represent two classic, blatantly 
anti-competitive business practices that should have been blocked 
by an antitrust enforcement authority. AT&T addressed concerns 
that the withdrawal of competition would cause prices to go up by 
agreeing to submit to rate regulation. 
So competition was possible in the early telephone industry, 
and competition died because the antitrust authorities did not 
stop AT&T from employing well-known anticompetitive strategies, 
not because the telephone system was a natural monopoly. 
Ironically, monopoly was not the justification for regulation, as is 
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commonly assumed. Regulation was instead the justification for 
monopoly. Moreover, these dynamics provide a classic example of 
a company using the political system and legal intervention to end 
competition and stands as a warning about the dangers associated 
with regulations designed to protect certain sectors of an industry 
against another. I prefer the preregulatory world in which two 
companies were racing to outbuild each other, as is happening to 
some extent right now between cable companies, telephone 
companies, and new entrants such as Google Fiber. 
GENE KIMMELMAN: I think your story is right except one 
of the problems is that those companies refused to interconnect 
with each other. We could have possibly had a non-monopoly, 
totally competitive system if they could have either had a 
regulator just imposing meaningful interconnection rules or could 
have figured it out in the marketplace themselves. That was an 
important factor in play. 
HOWARD LIM: Howard Lim, New York State Conservative 
Party. This Administration seems to enjoy doing things by 
executive order. In the area of net neutrality, if the Congress 
wanted to go in one direction and the President wanted to go in 
another, where does the ultimate authority lie? 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: I’m trying to be careful on my words 
here. The FCC is an independent agency and it is a creature and 
creation of Congress to implement the laws and the statutes 
enacted by Congress. We will faithfully do that. That is my charge 
and we’ll continue to do so. The President has an opportunity, and 
does, and expresses his views from time to time, and Presidents do 
on many different issues, not just in front of the FCC. So that’s 
something we will certainly take into account, just like we would 
take into account what comes from the Congress that’s not in the 
form of a law. 
GENE KIMMELMAN: There’s one thing that I think is 
worth nothing. Within the law right now, any regulation can be 
reviewed by Congress. There is actually a streamlined process for 
that. So if the FCC did something that the Congress didn’t like, it 
could reject it. That rejection would then go to the President who 
would have to sign it as a bill or veto it, and then it would be the 
question of whether the Congress would sustain or override that 
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veto. So there is at least a process by which one would naturally 
see a disagreement either worked out or just somehow resolved. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I’ll go even 
farther. Agencies are creatures of Congress. They possess only the 
authority given to them by Congress. The executive may have 
direct authority over matters such as foreign affairs, national 
security, military affairs, and the means necessary to make an 
administration run, such as the removal power. But dictating 
communications policy has never, to my knowledge, been asserted 
to be within the prerogative authority of the President. I think 
that a good court would be appropriately skeptical about 
presidential attempts to regulate via executive order without 
proper legislative authorization. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: The President, of 
course, obviously has the power to appoint the commissioners, 
initially, and I often read in the papers that if some hypothetical 
commission does something that Congress doesn’t like, Congress 
could respond by some kind of selective withdrawal of funds. I 
guess my intuitive reaction to that is that if they did it as a little 
stiletto, the President would pay no attention. If they wrapped it 
together with something, then you enter into the sort of 
bargaining position that we’ve seen an awful lot in the last few 
years, the outcome of which is uncertain, at any rate. But I’d be 
very interested in any reflections on that. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: There’s been a 
huge fight over the years about whether appropriations riders 
interfere with the executive power. My favorite one arose during 
the Administration of Lyndon Johnson, when Congress enacted an 
appropriations prohibiting the President from closing the Naval 
Academy’s dairy farm. Johnson quipped, “Thus the Congress, 
which has given the Navy Department authority over the world’s 
most powerful fleet, has withdrawn the Department’s authority 
over 380 cows.”12 There is a sense in which such 
micromanagement can be taken to absurd lengths, but the bottom 
line is that the farm remained open. That’s the nature of politics. 
																																																																																																																																																			
 12 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 341 (2008). 
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MICHAEL O’RIELLY: And it’s not just appropriations. Just 
to give you a historical perspective, there used to be seven FCC 
commissioners. There’s only five. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: What happened to the other 
two? 
[Laughter.] 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: The spots were removed, not the 
people. The people themselves are I’m sure living somewhere next 
to the farm. 
[Laughter.] 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: But there is a 
Supreme Court case called U.S. v. Lovett,13 where Congress 
attempted to effect the removal of three agency officials suspected 
of being “subversive” by enacting a statute providing that no 
salary or compensation should be paid to these officials unless 
they were reappointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The Supreme Court struck down the 
statute as an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Speaking from a historical 
perspective, back in the 1970s the FTC had done some work on 
something called Kid-Vid, where it was going to restrict 
advertising of sugared cereals, and Congress wasn’t happy about 
that. And the number of tools that Congress can bring to bear on 
an agency, when Congress is not happy, is quite remarkable. The 
FTC was shut down. The people didn’t get salaries. The agency 
staffing was reduced. There are a lot of tools that Congress can 
use. 
SAM MIORELLI: I’m Sam Miorelli. I’m from the Orlando 
Lawyers Chapter. We hear a lot of the latest discussion is the 
battles of the different types of technology—cable and whether we 
should have net neutrality and all—and I’m wondering why we 
haven’t heard more about how these different players mess with 
the ultimate devices. Once upon a time, AT&T owned the phones 
																																																																																																																																																			
 13 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
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and they regulated what the individual handset can do, and you 
still see that in the mobile space. Verizon notoriously delays 
Windows phone updates going out. AT&T notoriously delays 
updates on Android going to Samsung devices longer than often 
going to Google devices. And that really creates some large 
dislocations using those large monopoly powers in the 
marketplace for the end device, that as a consumer you have to 
think eighteen months from now, will my device get treated like a 
second- or third- or fourth-class citizen by the carrier, regardless 
of what the device manufacturer tries to do? 
I’m just wondering why it is we focus so much on the delivery 
of the data and we don’t look at some of the broader issues, that it 
doesn’t matter how good my pipe is if my phone crashes. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Commissioner 
Ohlhausen, do you want to take that? It seems like a competition 
issue. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Sure. I guess the question 
that I would have there is, how much of an incentive do the 
networks actually have to do this. An individual consumer may 
have just signed up for their phone, and has to wait until eighteen 
months to switch. But the amount of switching that goes on every 
month likely has a disciplining effect on the ability of one network, 
one provider to disadvantage a different type of phone. So you 
were saying that the one network had an incentive to— 
ATTENDEE: [Speaking off mic.] 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: But how big a share of the 
market of Verizon is Windows phones? I mean, Windows phones 
have a very small market share, I believe. 
ATTENDEE: Verizon has less control over what apps they 
can put on Windows phones than they have on Android, and 
there’s less market demand than there is for iPhones, so they 
essentially triple a platform so they push customers into a 
platform that they have more control over selling other services. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: There are a lot of 
complicated issues in this. Wireless ISPs regard Windows updates 
as the biggest denial-of-service attack in the entire network— 
[Laughter.] 
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PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: —because they all 
go on one night, and they sometimes overwhelm networks. So 
wireless networks have to manage their networks, otherwise none 
of those updates would get through. Moreover, we often forget how 
heterogeneous wireless technologies are. People complained about 
the original exclusivity deal between the Apple iPhone and AT&T. 
AT&T’s wireless network employed a technology known as 
HSPA+. Verizon and Sprint relied on a different technology 
known as EVDO. Interestingly, the iPhone was easier to deploy on 
HSPA+, and Apple had not worked out all the compatibility issue 
with EVDO. So the decision to launch initially with AT&T was 
driven in part by the technology. And what we are discovering is 
that companies are continuing to experiment with different 
designs that have can have a dramatic impact on the ecosystem. 
The other consideration is that the network providers often 
need to provide incentives to app providers to conserve bandwidth 
and to manage the network to ensure the platform performs 
properly. The essential security patches get priority over other 
product features. Wireless companies also need to encourage apps 
that are designed to conserve on bandwidth and attempt to work 
with app providers to make sure the platform delivers what end 
users really want, which is a safe phone, and updated in a timely 
manner, and which supports a wide variety of apps. 
You have to make some tradeoffs, and what you find is there 
is often a very difficult negotiation about how different actors are 
going to hand off data, when they are going to do so. All edge 
providers do not cooperate to the same extent. Both sides have 
interests in making their own lives as easy as possible. So what 
looks like intransigence and discriminatory behavior from one side 
may simply be a good faith disagreement over value or the normal 
tug and pull of the bargaining process. Regulators are ill-suited to 
resolve such disputes. My instinct would be to try to align 
incentives so that people would not have as much instinct to hold 
out or resort to legal resolution, to minimize the space of conflict. 
ATTENDEE: Thank you. I came in late but some of the 
earlier questions have given me the confidence to ask this. I’ll 
address it Professor Yoo since you’re free to give an opinion. 
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[Laughter.] 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I daresay Gene is 
in the same position. 
ATTENDEE: Well, this gets worse because I work in the 
stock market, and I observed when President Obama made his 
comments about net neutrality. I mean, whoa, it just crashed a 
whole bunch of big stocks. That led me to attend this session and 
wonder—and I believe I saw you on television for this, also, thank 
you very much—what is your interpretation of what President 
Obama was doing? I mean, does that funnel into something real 
practical that he can put his hands on, or was he just making an 
expression, do you think, of his desired policy for what he’d like to 
see? It was quite mystifying. It certainly destabilized a whole 
bunch of companies and a lot of thought as to what competition 
policy currently is. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Before I answer 
the direct question, the fact that your observation about the 
market reaction actually, I think, is an important one, but many 
people suggested that, “Oh, markets don’t care about this stuff.” It 
matters, and, in fact, we should expect it to change stock prices. 
I am not a mind-reader. Let me speculate. Senator, 
Candidate, and President Obama repeatedly endorsed network 
neutrality, and that position was popular with many of his 
supporters. A political explanation might be that in a world in 
which you are unlikely to get legislation through Congress, 
playing to one’s political base may be an excellent strategy. There 
are many Democratic members of Congress who are raising money 
around the issue of network neutrality. And he may look at the 
several million e-mails sent to the FCC and think there may be 
some political advantages to endorsing such a large public 
outpouring of sentiment. Another possibility is that the president 
was attempting to provide cover for the FCC by making a 
regulatory action that might have looked intrusive appear 
moderate in comparison. And it could simply be that some people 
in the White House studied the issue and concluded that on the 
merits, Title II reclassification was the best legal approach. 
At this point, it is not entirely clear how this issue is going to 
play out because, as Commissioner O’Rielly points out, the FCC is 
an independent agency, a point that Chairman Wheeler has 
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reminded everyone about. I assume, in terms of the politics, that 
the President’s remarks will make it more likely that the FCC will 
reclassify broadband as a Title II service. At the risk of putting 
Commissioner O’Rielly on the spot, I would note that there is a 
division in the Commission, and it’s not entirely clear how the 
Chairman is going to get to three votes on his preferred proposal. I 
would say that the President’s announcement now makes 
compromise even harder. So my guess is that if the President was 
trying to get this as an outcome, and it is quite likely that the FCC 
will embrace Title II. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Unless someone has a 
question, I have a question. Okay. Go ahead. 
BERIN SZOKA: Berin Szoka, TechFreedom. Gene, a lot of 
what’s driving this debate, a lot of the argument for Title II boils 
down to this assertion that you made today that a 706 approach 
isn’t workable to address concerns about discrimination because 
the administration of it would be just too difficult, it would be too 
burdensome for small providers. But there are many people—Hal 
Singer, for example, of the Progressive Policy Institute—who have 
called for an approach where you would work through 706 and you 
could actually marry rule of reason with a presumption. So you 
could say, at the outset, that prioritization is presumed lawful, but 
you place a fairly small burden on websites or edge providers to 
show that there’s a harm to them, and at that point the burden 
would shift to the broadband providers to defend themselves. And 
that gets you a way of screening out frivolous complaints, without 
making it so difficult for edge companies, especially small 
companies, to raise their concerns. That’s something that could be 
done under Section 706. It’s something that’s very consistent with 
where the Supreme Court came out in the Activist decision, or the 
Ninth Circuit came out recently in another decision. 
What do you say to that? Are you open to such an approach, 
and, if so, why do we need Title II? Why can’t we do that under 
706? 
GENE KIMMELMAN: We said from the outset that the 
commission should look to use all its tools and figure out what the 
best ones were, and that includes Section 706. I think there are 
some interesting things that could be done with 706. There are 
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also some things that could be way overreaching that would be 
much more regulatory than I think any of us would like, so one 
has to be a bit careful there. 
My great concern is the history of the FCC in doing case-by-
case analysis, which has been more in the media area, with 
programming disputes. From my perspective it’s been a pretty 
dismal history—very slow-moving and contentious. And so it’s 
implausible to do what you just described, Berin. But this is not 
the way that the commission has functioned very well in the past. 
One could use Title II and one could use certain 706 tools—one 
could use a variety of tools. The critical thing is actually what 
Commissioner O’Rielly said. We should be looking for something 
that’s light-handed. This is a highly dynamic industry, a lot of 
technological changes, a lot of things moving, as Chris’s charts 
show, and I think one should be cautious whatever the tools are, 
and do it carefully. 
The question is whether you can come up with something 
that balances the right forces, sends the right signals to the 
marketplace, and actually avoids much regulatory intervention. 
So I don’t know whether 706 tools, combined the way you just 
described them, would actually work that way. I don’t think it’s 
impossible but the history of the FCC in dealing with case-by-case 
analysis is not a very good one. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: But you do have 
to have tools designed for the goals. I organized a panel in D.C. 
about a month ago, in which Mark Cooper spoke, and he doesn’t 
support Title II, even though he’s a strong network neutrality 
proponent, because he said Title II would not stop paid 
prioritization. Common carrier regimes permit multiple classes of 
service that cost different amounts of money. So what I find odd 
about the President’s announcement is that he said, “We need to 
ban paid prioritization” at the same time he said that “we need to 
do so through Title II.” Even if preventing paid prioritization was 
your goal, it is not clear that Title II is the proper tool. I think that 
there is some merit to prioritizing some traffic over other traffic. 
For example, I personally would pay more for a better connection 
from my home to my office, my e-mail server, and the other 
handful of locations that I tend to visit to the most. That would 
make my Internet connection more valuable to me. So I actually 
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think that pay prioritization opens up new sources of consumer 
value, because we value some connections more than others. 
But set that aside. I didn’t quite see how Title II will 
accomplish all of the President’s goals. I personally think Title I 
and 706 have more potential to accomplish the goals that the 
President set out. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Actually, I have a question 
about paid prioritization. The big edge players can already buy 
better delivery service through content delivery networks, like 
Akamai. Thus, the idea that right now everything is exactly the 
same and everyone on the edge has the same route and speed 
through the network, I don’t even think is true right now. So I’m 
uncertain of why we’re acting as if that’s the case right now and 
we want to keep it that way. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: The Internet is a 
network of networks, and people often forget what that means. If 
you look at the routing tables, there are 47,000 different 
autonomous systems that make up the Internet, and they mostly 
interconnect with each other through arm’s length negotiations for 
different levels of investment and capacity. The idea that two bits 
coming to the same place from similar sources would pay the same 
amount and take the same amount of time blinks reality. Any 
attempt by regulators to equalize all of those differences will 
inevitably lead to fairly comprehensive regulation of 
interconnection disputes. Moreover, if the regulators set one price 
too low, traffic is going to flood through the mispriced link. In a 
normal market, the natural response would be to increase the 
price until demand equals supply. You cannot do that, however, if 
prices are regulated. 
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s comments also underscores that 
the Internet’s topology is endogenous. The interconnection price is 
the last of a long series of decisions. Firms weigh the cost of 
interconnection against the cost of alternatives, such as employing 
a CDN or negotiating a direct connection instead indirect 
connections. Once one recognizes the full range of options open to 
a party negotiating an interconnection agreement, it becomes a 
much richer space. Focusing on the price paid is too narrow. I 
understand that one side of the bargain would like to pay as little 
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as possible, while the other side would like to pay as much as 
possible. Those who see a short-term advantage in government 
adjudication of prices may later find that the tables have turned. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: We can’t speak simply 
of a quick system because obviously anything could happen and 
what’s happening now is a mixture of systems. But I guess you 
still could pose the question of whether the focus on competition or 
the focus on regulation, which of them, as a practical, institutional 
matter, invites more rent-seeking than the other, and to what 
extent can one work out trade-offs between the two systems, 
which minimize rent-seeking? I would be interested in anyone’s 
reflections on that. 
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN: Looking at public choice 
theory, when you think about an agency like the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Department of Justice, which are not industry-
specific regulators, typically they’re harder to capture. Who is 
going to invest the resources to capture them, when such agencies 
only look at your conduct and your deals every now and then? By 
comparison, I think when you have an industry-specific regulator 
which is making a lot of decisions about a very discrete set of 
players, the incentive to engage in rent-seeking tilts the playing 
field in your favor, and raise your rivals’ costs, I think is probably 
a lot more beneficial a strategy for a company to engage in. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Gene, did you want to 
say something? 
GENE KIMMELMAN: From a perspective of captured 
agency concerns I can fully understand that. From a perspective of 
expertise, I can just say that as much as I think the Department 
of Justice Antitrust Division lawyers and economists are brilliant, 
they often feel like they have to defer to FCC expertise in certain 
areas, because they do so much in so many realms that they can’t 
necessarily keep up with the details. I think, also, it’s not just 
rent-seeking in a traditional analysis. It’s a whole ecosystem. So if 
I get away from the Windows update example, but I get into a 
question of consumer inconvenience and problems of 
interoperability, those are things that are not very good antitrust 
issues, often. They’re not pure market foreclosures. It doesn’t have 
to be a monopolist or a dominant player, but it can be an 
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enormous drag on the economy and harm to consumers that is 
short of an antitrust violation. 
But if you have an expert agency that has a mandate to look 
at that, you might be able to deal with that problem and actually 
augment competition. It’s not necessarily an antitrust issue. So 
there are different issues that need to be addressed in this 
competitive analysis. And then, in this example you used of paid 
prioritization, you just mix interconnection and paid prioritization 
and, frankly, I don’t know what the President meant, but even 
with what the President said, all of the interconnection companies 
don’t think it addressed their issues of what they’re paying for 
CDNs or direct transit or direct connection. So you have to look at 
a broader picture of this because it’s a very complicated 
infrastructure issue. You have to look at what would be equal and 
what wouldn’t be equal. My sense is many of the things you 
described, Chris, would not be touched as requiring equal 
payment or treatment. It’s a much narrower set of issues where 
there’s a terminating monopoly problem that at least will need to 
be looked at, with the President weighing in with one particular 
approach. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I think Gene is 
absolutely right. There are issues with which the FCC deals that 
are not competition issues. The one that I think is the most 
important right now is spectrum policy. That is an allocation 
decision that involves fighting with the Department of Defense 
and working to get more spectrum into play. I think allocating 
more spectrum to broadband is in the best interest of the country, 
and I think I hope the FCC can spend more time focusing on that. 
MICHAEL O’RIELLY: It’s an option if you want to play. 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: Yeah, absolutely. 
I’ve got a little change in my pockets. Let’s see what we can do. 
[Laughter.] 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: I also note that 
Europe once held aspiration of abolishing telecommunications 
regulation and relying entirely on competition policy. Their hope 
was that once markets became sufficiently competitive, sector-
2016] TELECOMMUNICATIONS 817 
specific regulation would disappear. European policymakers no 
longer regard that as a realistic outcome any time soon. It may 
happen someday that we can rely exclusively on competition 
policy, but no one is expecting it to happen soon. 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: Let me just interrupt 
please. Why have the Europeans given up on sector-specific 
regulation? 
PROFESSOR CHRISTOPHER S. YOO: The European 
telecommunications sector faces many challenges. National 
governments still own major stakes in incumbent telephone 
companies, such as Deutsche Telekom, Orange, and Telia Sonera, 
and they have shown little real interest in further privatization. 
The problem is exemplified by Europe’s ongoing discussions about 
the need for a digital single market. Despite the rhetoric, they do 
not seem to want a single market because of the pressure it would 
place on many domestic companies that are not globally 
competitive. A good example of the challenges of creating a single 
market is the merger of East and West Germany. A large number 
of companies in East Germany that were unable to compete with 
West German companies went bankrupt, which in turn caused a 
great deal of unemployment and dislocation. Policymakers may 
find the prospect of something similar happening in their 
countries to be quite daunting. 
So a huge gap exists between what Europeans say constitutes 
valid competition policy and what they actually do. Part of the 
reluctance to embrace competition stems from political concerns of 
not wanting to endure major dislocations. Part of it stems from the 
fact that governments with ownership stakes in European 
telecommunications companies derive real value from shielding 
those companies from competition. I was talking to a major figure 
in the German national regulatory agency. She explained that 
although institutional barriers existed designed to prevent those 
in charge of triose investments from exercising any influence over 
regulatory policy, she acknowledged that the government does 
enjoy the regular dividend that it receives from that investment. 
Increasing competition would place that revenue stream and that 
investment in jeopardy. 
The interconnection point is quite complicated. Netflix 
recently changed network providers from Verizon to another 
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provider who had a peering arrangement with Comcast. Peering 
agreements are barter arrangements that necessarily reflect some 
notion of reciprocity. The complication is that Netflix represents 
one-third of prime-time Internet traffic. When a company that 
generates that amount of traffic changes providers, it is quite 
likely that the new traffic flows from the new connection will no 
longer comply with the reciprocity expectations. When traffic 
becomes sufficiently asymmetrical, most peering contracts call for 
the network generating excess traffic either to acquire more ports 
or to begin making payments to compensate the other network for 
the increased traffic that is out of balance. I think it is best to look 
at Netflix’s decision as an endogenous choice. They used to be with 
a network provider who had no trouble providing adequate service 
because it was willing to pay additional compensation as Netflix’s 
traffic grew. They switched to a cheaper provider that generally 
refused to pay more in an attempt to make Comcast and other 
similarly situated actors foot the bill. In short, they went looking 
for a bargain and got burned. Now Netflix is negotiating direct 
interconnection deals instead. The simple truth is that Netflix is 
the single largest source of traffic on the Internet and is still 
growing. The question is who is going to pay for the cost of 
transmitting this additional traffic. While both actors wish the 
other side will pay all of the costs, my instinct is that since both 
sides derive value from the additional traffic, both sides should 
bear some of the costs. The actual allocation between the two 
parties should be the subject of negotiation. 
There is a tendency to think edge providers are at the mercy 
of the network providers. David Clark of M.I.T., just by 
coincidence, happened to be running trace route studies of the 
connection between Netflix and Comcast in the days leading up to 
their direct interconnection agreement. The data suggested that 
Netflix had more ability to control how the traffic was handled 
than did Comcast. Netflix appeared to shift its traffic among the 
three transit providers connecting Comcast and Netflix on a day-
to-day basis, with one transit provider being completely congested 
one day and another one being completely congested on other 
days. So both sides are fairly nimble here, and they are, in a lot of 
ways, positioned to defend themselves. 
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This is happening in real time. A regulator coming in to clean 
up this mess after the fact is going to have a very, very hard time 
doing that. These data suggest that the edge providers are not 
simply at the mercy of the network providers. I think that both 
sides are in an excellent position to bargain with one another. In 
fact, edge providers and network providers are channel partners 
that depend on each other to create value. They should find ways 
to cooperate to maximize their joint business and agree to 
allocation of the surplus that will hold for the long run. That is my 
optimistic view. I don’t see a great reason for optimism in the 
short run. 
[Laughter.] 
JUDGE STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS: I guess we’re 
exhausted. I don’t see any hands up. All right. Will you join me in 
thanking our panelists. 
[Applause.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
